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ABSTRACT
We demonstrate that human decision-making agents do social learn-
ing whether it is beneficial or not. Specifically, we consider binary
Bayesian hypothesis testing with multiple agents voting sequentially
for a team decision, where each one observes earlier-acting agents’
votes as well as a conditionally independent and identically dis-
tributed private signal. While the best strategy (for the team ob-
jective) is to ignore the votes of earlier-acting agents, human agents
instead tend to be affected by others’ decisions. Furthermore, they
are almost equally affected in the team setting as when they are in-
centivized only for individual correctness. These results suggest that
votes of earlier-acting agents should be withheld (not shared as pub-
lic signals) to improve team decision-making performance; humans
are insufficiently rational to innately apply the optimal decision rules
that would ignore the public signals.
Index Terms—Bayesian hypothesis testing, distributed detec-
tion and fusion, human behavior, sequential decision making, social
learning
1. INTRODUCTION
Social learning is the process of learning from publicly observable
behaviors of others, which are often called public signals, before
acting. Even though social learning causes agents acting in sequence
to sometimes herd to the incorrect decision when the private signals
are boundedly informative [1, 2],1 it enables asymptotically perfect
decision making otherwise [3].
While social learning is rational behavior that leads to better de-
cisions (lower error probabilities) for individuals acting in sequence,
it may not be good when agents form a team. In [4], we introduced
a distributed binary hypothesis testing scenario in which decision-
making agents sequentially observe the decisions of earlier-acting
agents and private signals that are conditionally independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) given the hypothesis, and their individ-
ual decisions are fused into a single team decision by a fixed sym-
metric rule. For Bayes risk minimization (a single common goal for
all the agents), social learning becomes futile in the sense that the
optimal behavior of an individual is to ignore the public signals pro-
duced by the earlier-acting agents. This is discussed in detail in [5,6],
with some key insights reviewed in Section 2.2.
∗The first author performed the work while with the Research Laboratory
of Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
†This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation
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1A signal Y generated under a state H is called boundedly informative if
there exists κ > 0 such that κ < fY |H(y |h) < 1/κ for all y and h.
There is significant evidence that humans perform approximate
Bayesian reasoning [7–11]. However, group decision making is
more subtle [12, 13], and the difference between individualistic be-
havior (“I want to be correct”) and team-oriented behavior (“I want
to contribute optimally to the group decision”) is even more subtle.
This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that the futility of social
learning result of [6] holds for conditionally i.i.d. private signals but
not more generally for conditionally independent private signals.
This seems beyond the limits of innate Bayesian reasoning.
In this paper, we study whether human agents are rational
enough to ignore public signals when it is optimal for them to do so.
We design two decision-making scenarios and conduct experiments
with human subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk. These experi-
ments reveal that not only do human agents perform social learning
in both individualistic and team decision making, but also their be-
haviors in these two settings are hardly distinguishable—which is
significantly suboptimal behavior.
Section 2 specifies our binary decision-making framework with
symmetric aggregation and reviews the optimal decision-making
rules. Section 3 describes the experiments and discusses human
behaviors observed from them. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. INDIVIDUALISTIC AND TEAM GOALS
We consider a scenario of binary Bayesian hypothesis testing. There
is a group of N agents who sequentially make a binary decision.
They know the prior probability of the two hypotheses, H = 0 and
H = 1. The Bayes risk of their decision Ĥ is given by
c10P{Ĥ = 1, H = 0}+ c01P{Ĥ = 0, H = 1}
= c10p0P{Ĥ = 1|H = 0}+ c01p1P{Ĥ = 0|H = 1}, (1)
where p0 = P{H = 0} and p1 = P{H = 1} = 1 − p0 are the
prior probabilities and c10 and c01 are the Bayes costs associated
with Type I and II errors, respectively. We assume all agents have
the same Bayes costs. Decision making that minimizes the Bayes
risk is optimal.
Each agent observes a private signal Yn that is dependent on the
true hypothesis. The conditional distribution fYn |H(yn |h) is i.i.d.
across all agents.
As the agents sequentially make decisions, those decisions be-
come available as public signals to all other agents. The first agent
who makes a decision has a private signal only. The second agent
has a private signal and a public signal from the first agent. The
third agent has a private signal and two public signals from the first
two agents, and so on. We will discuss how Nora, the nth decision
maker, should make a decision in two cases.
2.1. Optimal Individualistic Decision Making
The first case is when the agents are optimizing only for the accuracy
their own decisions [14]. In other words, Nora makes her decision
Ĥn to minimize her Bayes cost:
c10p0P{Ĥn = 1 |H = 0}+ c01p1P{Ĥn = 0 |H = 1}. (2)
Before making a decision, she observes public signals Ĥ1, . . .,
Ĥn−1—the decisions of her preceding agents—and a private signal
Yn. She can learn some information about the true hypothesis from
these signals. Her decision rule should be the likelihood ratio test
that compares the likelihood of all private and public signals on each
hypothesis:
fYn,Ĥ1,...,Ĥn−1 |H(yn, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−1 | 1)
fYn,Ĥ1,...,Ĥn−1 |H(yn, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−1 | 0)
Ĥn=1
R
Ĥn=0
c10p0
c01p1
. (3)
Conditioned on H , her public signals are independent of her private
signal. Thus, the decision rule can be rewritten as
fYn |H(yn | 1)
fYn |H(yn | 0)
Ĥn=1
R
Ĥn=0
c10qn
c01(1− qn) , (4)
where
qn , p0 ×
pĤ1,...,Ĥn−1 |H(ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−1 | 0)
pĤ1,...,Ĥn−1(ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−1)
= pH | Ĥ1,...,Ĥn−1(0 | ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−1). (5)
This optimal decision rule suggests that Nora use her public signals
to update the prior probability to a posterior probability—which is
often called belief update—and determine the optimal threshold of
the likelihood ratio of her private signal. The process of belief update
is discussed with more detail in [14, 15].
2.2. Optimal Team Decision Making
The second case is when the agents are optimizing for the accuracy
of a team decision. Like in Section 2.1, agents still make decisions
sequentially and can observe all decisions made before them along
with their own private signals. Now, decisions are fused by a sym-
metric L-out-of-N rule: If L or more agents choose 1, then the team
decision is Ĥ = 1; otherwise Ĥ = 0.2 The following Bayes risk is
applied to everyone:
R =c10p0P{∑Nn=1 Ĥn ≥ L |H = 0}
+ c01p1P{∑Nn=1 Ĥn ≤ L− 1 |H = 1}. (6)
Intuitively, the improvement of individual decisions would drive
the improvement of the team decision. It has been shown, however,
that optimal individual decisions can harm the team decision making
in some cases. What is easily overlooked here is that, effectively, the
fusion rule is changing as the agents act in sequence. Once the first
agent chooses Ĥ1 = 1, for example, the effective fusion rule for
the remaining agents is the (L−1)-out-of-(N−1) rule, i.e., L−1
more votes for 1 among N−1 will determine the team decision to
2L-out-of-N rules generalize the common use of majority rule in human
decision making, where L = dN+1
2
e. Rules requiring unanimity are given
by L = 0 and L = N . Optimal decision fusion is discussed in [16].
be 1. It is proven in [6] that agents need to do both belief update
and fusion rule evolution for optimal decision making, and in the
case of conditionally i.i.d. private signals, they end up with the same
decision rule as when they do not have any public signal,
fYn |H(yn | 1)
fYn |H(yn | 0)
Ĥn=1
R
Ĥn=0
c10p0
c01p1
. (7)
Belief update encourages an agent to agree with earlier-acting
agents. The less intuitive aspect, as stated in [6]: “a good agent
does not take lightly the disenfranchisement of later-acting agents.”
3. PRACTICAL HUMAN DECISION MAKING
We have shown that social learning is optimal behavior in individual-
istic decision making but not necessarily in team decision making. In
practice, human agents deviate from optimality in various ways. Our
goal is to test the following two hypotheses through experiments:
Hypothesis 1 Human agents are affected by public signals in team
decision making.
Hypothesis 2 Human agents are less affected by public signals in
team decision making than they are in individualistic decision mak-
ing.
Hypothesis 1 argues that human agents are irrational because
they are supposed to ignore public signals in team decision making.
However, they may be rational enough to rely less on public sig-
nals in team decision making than in individual decision making as
suggested by Hypothesis 2.
3.1. Design of Experiments
We conduct two experiments. Experiment A is designed to measure
human decision rules at a fine scale. Experiment B is designed with
a simpler setting to reconfirm the results of Experiment A.3
Most parts of the two experiments are identical: both experi-
ments assume a game show where one basket is presented and con-
testants guess which of two baskets it is. The basket is randomly
chosen between Basket A, which has 70 red and 30 blue balls, and
Basket B, which has 30 red and 70 blue balls. The prior probabil-
ity of each basket is 0.5, and all contestants are made aware of this.
Seven contestants make decisions by the following procedure:
1. The order of decision making is determined.
2. The first contestant comes out, draws from the basket, and
replaces drawn balls.
3. He/she guesses whether the basket is A or B and announces
his/her answer. In the meantime, other contestants cannot see
the balls but can hear the answer.
4. Repeat (2) and (3) until the last contestant.
The contestants get a private signal in step (2) and public signals in
step (3).
Each experiment has two versions of evaluating the answers. In
version 1 (individualistic goal), each contestant who gives the right
3Before starting these experiments, the authors have passed a training
course on human subjects research to accommodate MIT regulation. The
experiments have been approved by the Committee on the Use of Humans
as Experimental Subjects (COUHES): COUHES Protocols No. 1310005949
and 1403006285, respectively.
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Fig. 1: Thresholds of human decision rules. (a) Human agents’ average thresholds and optimal thresholds for various public signals (sorted
in increasing order of optimal threshold for the individualistic goal). (b) Distribution of thresholds for individualistic goal when the public
signal is (A→A→A→B). (c) Distribution of thresholds for team goal with the same public signal.
answer wins a prize. In version 2 (team goal), all seven contestants
win a prize if the majority is right and otherwise no one wins a prize.
We can verify Hypothesis 1 from the result of version 1 and Hypoth-
esis 2 by comparing the results of versions 1 and 2. All winning
contestants get an equal prize to prevent competition among them.
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers living in the U.S. participated
in these experiments. Each worker was randomly assigned to ei-
ther version without even knowing the existence of the other version.
We intentionally hide it because otherwise they may think that they
should behave differently. Furthermore, each worker could partici-
pate in at most one experiment.
Regardless of the version, we present each test subject with a
number of situations with various decision-making positions and
various public signals.4 For each situation, the subjects are to answer
their decision thresholds—i.e., the minimum number of red balls in
the private signal to cause them to choose Basket A. We make it
clear that the prior probability of each basket is 0.5 because human
agents are not likely to correctly incorporate a different prior. The
rational behavior without a public signal is to choose Basket A if
the participant draws more red balls than blue balls and Basket B
otherwise.
Every worker gets paid a fixed amount of base reward upon
completion of the experiment. In addition, we offer a bonus up to
three times of the base reward depending on the worker’s decision-
making performance in order to encourage them to think carefully
and thoroughly. The workers participating in version 1 get a bonus
depending on how close to optimal their answers are; the workers
participating in version 2 get a bonus depending on how much their
answers improve team decisions.
4E.g., what is your decision rule when you are the third agent and observe
(A→B) as a public signal?
3.2. Experiment A: Complex Private Signal
The difference between experiments A and B is the number of balls
drawn as a private signal. In Experiment A, each agent draws 9 balls
from the basket as the private signal in order for us to finely monitor
the decision rules of human agents.
In total 200 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers have participated
in Experiment A; half in A-1 and the other half in A-2. Each subject
is asked the same 29 situations of various public signals regardless
of the version.
Fig. 1 summarizes the results of Experiment A, dashed curves
for Experiment A-1 and solid curves for Experiment A-2. It is no-
table that human decision makers do not change their decision rules
based on the different goals (individual vs. team), unlike the opti-
mum behavior.
Fig. 1a shows the thresholds—the minimum number of red balls
in a private signal that is required to choose A. The threshold of
human agents drawn in Fig. 1a is the average of thresholds answered
by 100 subjects in each version.
Human agents with the individualistic goal seemingly learn from
public signals and alter their thresholds accordingly. The alteration,
however, is weaker than optimal. For example, when the fourth agent
observes all three preceding agents have chosen Basket A, the agent
should choose A even if the private signal has just three red balls.
Average human decision makers, however, choose Basket A if their
private signal has at least four red balls.
Among the situations, we specifically examine when the fifth
agent observes public signals of three A’s and one B: (A→A→A→B),
(A→A→B→A), (A→B→A→A), or (B→A→A→A). These pub-
lic signals should be differently interpreted according to who has
answered B. When an earlier-acting agent answers B, it is likely
a wrong answer due to an unlikely private signal, which thus is
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Fig. 2: Behavior of human agents when they observe various public signals. (a) Individual decision-making. (b) Team decision-making.
reversed to A by following agents. On the contrary, when a later-
acting agent answers B, it should be considered more seriously as
the agent should have had a private signal strong enough to counter-
act preceding agents’ decisions. Therefore the optimal threshold is
2.5 for public signal (B→A→A→A) but 4.5 for (A→A→A→B).
It turns out that human agents use 3.5 as their threshold in all
four situations. One of our interpretations is that human agents do
not believe that other people are fully rational—they may think the
agent who has chosen B is wrong. Another interpretation is that
they do not care about the order in which the decisions are made but
simply process the public signal as three A’s and one B.
Considering the team decision-making, the average threshold of
human agents is similar to that in individual decision-making. Hu-
mans take into account the public signals when they have a team goal
as much as when they have an individualistic goal, even though the
optimal behavior is to ignore the public signals in the former case.
For a more precise comparison, we ran two-sample Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests of the distributions of 100 thresholds between indi-
vidualistic and team goals. The test accepts the null hypothesis—the
two distributions are the same—in all cases but one with probability
greater than 0.05; in half of the cases with probability greater than
0.9. For example, Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c compare the distributions of
human agents in individual and team decision-making cases with
respect to their decision thresholds when (A→A→A→B) is the
public signal. The two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test accepts
they are the same distribution with probability of 0.96. Interested
readers may see [5] for the comparison in all 29 situations. As a
result, we accept Hypothesis 1 but reject Hypothesis 2.
3.3. Experiment B: Simple Private Signal
We have found out that human agents are not fully rational in the
sense that they do not learn from public signals as much as they
should for the individualistic goal and they learn from public signals
while they should not for the team goal. However, the private signal
consisting of nine balls may be too complicated for the agents to cor-
rectly process. Therefore, Experiment B was designed with a simple
private signal: each contestant draws only one ball. Everything else
is the same between experiments A and B.
A hundred Amazon Mechanical Turk workers have participated
in Experiment B; half in B-1 and the other half in B-2. Each subject
is asked 18 situations of various public signals. We asked subjects
their choice when the private signal is a red ball and when it is blue.
Fig. 2 depicts the most common behavior of the subjects in each
situation. The behavior is summarized as either Not Herding (NH)—
ignoring public signals and following private signals—or Herding
toward A (HA)—following public signals and ignoring private sig-
nals.
Most subjects in individualistic decision making correctly ig-
nore or follow public signals, depending on the particular public sig-
nal. Subjects in team decision making, however, still follow pub-
lic signals although they should not. In fact, they show the same
behavior in both individual and team decision-making except one
situation—when (A→A) is the public signal.
This experiment with simple private signals again supports our
conclusions in Section 3.2. First, human agents do not seem to un-
derstand that optimal decision-making as a team is different from
individualistic decision-making. Second, they seem rather rational
when they are deciding to meet the individualistic goal, even though
they are limited in their processing abilities when working with com-
plex private signals.
4. CONCLUSION
We have conducted experiments to test if human agents adopt opti-
mal decision rules by using public signals in individualistic decision
making and by not using them in team decision making. It is worth
evaluating human rationality especially because the optimal decision
rule for the team case is counterintuitive. Our experiments have re-
vealed that human agents are not fully rational when they observe
public signals.
With public signals, human agents do social learning. They can
interpret public signals and adjust their decision thresholds accord-
ingly for the individualistic goal. That being said, we could observe
two limitations from human agents. First, they seem incapable of
perfectly tuning decision rules to complex private signals. Second,
they fail to draw correct inferences from the order of public signals.
They do not differentiate between the cases when the minority public
signal is produced by an earlier-acting or later-acting agent.
Furthermore, it turns out that human agents behave very simi-
larly for a team goal and for an individualistic goal, though this is
suboptimal. They seem to use all information available to them in
decisions. This suggests a simple design prescription for a crowd-
sourcing platform or online poll that aids human team decision mak-
ing: it is better to hide irrelevant information that may lead to a
suboptimal decision. This observation emphasizes the importance
of design of voting rules that can enhance humans’ rationality and
optimal opinion aggregation.
5. REFERENCES
[1] Abhijit V. Banerjee, “A simple model of herd behavior,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 797–817,
Aug. 1992.
[2] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch, “A
theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as infor-
mational cascades,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100,
no. 5, pp. 992–1026, Oct. 1992.
[3] Lones Smith and Peter Sørensen, “Pathological outcomes of
observational learning,” Econometrica, vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 371–
398, Mar. 2000.
[4] Joong Bum Rhim and Vivek K Goyal, “Keep ballots secret: On
the futility of social learning in decision making by voting,” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Pro-
cess., Vancouver, Canada, May 2013.
[5] Joong Bum Rhim, Aggregation and Influence in Teams of Im-
perfect Decision Makers, Ph.d. thesis, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Cambridge, MA, June 2014.
[6] Joong Bum Rhim and Vivek K Goyal, “Distributed hypothe-
sis testing with social learning and symmetric fusion,” IEEE
Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 62, no. 23, pp. 6298–
6308, Dec. 1, 2014.
[7] John A. Swets, Wilson P. Tanner, Jr., and Theodore G. Birdsall,
“Decision processes in perception,” Psychological Review, vol.
68, no. 5, pp. 301–340, Sept. 1961.
[8] W. Kip Viscusi, “Are individuals Bayesian decision makers?,”
American Economics Review, vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 381–3853,
May 1985.
[9] Gary L. Brase, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, “Individ-
uation, counting, and statistical inference: The role of fre-
quency and whole-object representations in judgment under
uncertainty,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
vol. 127, no. 1, pp. 3–21, Mar. 1998.
[10] Christopher J. Gill, Lora Sabin, and Christopher H. Schmid,
“Why clinicians are natural Bayesians,” British Medical Jour-
nal, vol. 330, pp. 1080–1083, May 2005.
[11] Murray Glanzer, Andew Hilford, and Laurence T. Maloney,
“Likelihood ratio decisions in memory: Three implied regu-
larities,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, vol. 16, no. 3, pp.
431–455, June 2009.
[12] Robert D. Sorkin, Christopher J. Hays, and Ryan West,
“Signal-detection analysis of group decision making,” Psycho-
logical Review, vol. 108, no. 1, pp. 183–203, Jan. 2001.
[13] Jack B. Soll and Richard P. Larrick, “Strategies for revising
judgment: How (and how well) people use others opinions,”
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 780–805, May 2009.
[14] Joong Bum Rhim and Vivek K Goyal, “Social teaching: Being
informative vs. being right in sequential decision making,” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Information Theory, Istanbul, Turkey,
July 2013.
[15] Joong Bum Rhim and Vivek K Goyal, “Social teaching: Be-
ing informative vs. being right in sequential decision making,”
arXiv:1212.6592v1 [cs.IT]., Dec. 2012.
[16] Pramod K. Varshney, Distributed Detection and Data Fusion,
Springer-Verlag, 1997.
